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[W]e cannot be over-nice about legality and fair play where it is a question of 
vital oil interests. 
The British ambassador in Tehran to the consul in Ahwaz, May 1946
1
 
 
 
In its mid-twentieth-century heyday, the city of Abadan in southwestern Iran 
boasted the world’s biggest oil refinery, and one of the Middle East’s most 
modern cities. The 1980–88 war with Iraq turned the city into a mere shadow 
of its former self, and many locals and former residents today yearn 
nostalgically for the Abadan of the past, with its harmonious, cosmopolitan 
society. Yet this romantic popular recollection sometimes glosses over the fact 
that Abadan’s trajectory from a mostly Arab village to a complex multicultural 
city was interrupted by moments of inter-ethnic violence. Conversely, the 
nationalist Iranian historiography—which hails the city’s fight to oust British 
imperialism, nationalize oil, overthrow the shah, and resist the Iraqi 
invasion—also tends to reduce inter-ethnic conflict to the mere result of 
foreign enemy conspiracies.
2
  
In this chapter, I will attempt to counterbalance neglect, omissions and 
distortions by bringing to light a particular event in Abadan’s history of 
violence, and placing it within its spatial context. On 14 July 1946, during a 
strike by oil workers, clashes broke out in Abadan between socialist labor 
  
activists and members of a so-called Arab Tribal Union. Using oil company 
archives, accounts by labor activists, and local memoirs, I will investigate this 
under-examined event
3
 that stands at the contentious intersection of local, 
national and global politics, imperialism, ethnicity, and industrial urbanism. In 
this investigation, one unit stands out in Abadan’s geography: the club. As a 
key site of change and strife in Abadan’s urban life, the club encapsulates 
certain important dynamics in the trajectory of the modern Iranian nation-
state, its history of anti-imperialist struggle, and the place of its marginalized 
minorities. 
 
Securing Output: Abadan under the Company’s Aegis  
Abadan’s modern history is inextricably tied to that of the Anglo-Persian—
later Anglo-Iranian—Oil Company (henceforth, “the Company”). When oil 
was struck in Iran in 1908, Abadan was a village on an island between two 
rivers leading to the Persian Gulf—an outpost on Iran’s border with Ottoman 
Iraq. It was inhabited mainly by Arab tribes living in adobe huts, cultivating 
date palms, fishing, and trading with the neighboring cities of Mohammerah 
and Basra. Whereas the northern and eastern parts of what is today the 
Khuzestan province were inhabited by Lors, Bakhtiyaris, and various Persian-
speaking communities, the south had been dominated by Arab tribes since at 
least the seventh century. By the sixteenth century, it was known as 
Arabistan,
4
 and from 1897, it was under the control of Sheikh Khaz’al of 
Mohammerah. Like the Bakhtiyari khans in central Khuzestan, where oil was 
  
discovered, the sheikh acknowledged the sovereignty of the Iranian Qajar 
shahs in Tehran, but ruled more or less autonomously.  
Since the eighteenth century, Britain had treated the Persian Gulf 
littoral around Bushehr, south of Abadan, as its de facto possession. Moreover, 
the Constitutional Revolution (1905-11) and subsequent civil war, the 1907 
division of Iran into Russian and British spheres of interest, and the increased 
military presence of the British Government of India in southern Iran up to 
and during the First World War all factored into the Iranian central 
government’s dysfunction in Khuzestan. Consequently, when British 
diplomats and Company officials were tasked with facilitating the 
establishment of an oil industry in Khuzestan, they circumvented the Iranian 
government and instead dealt directly with the region’s tribal leaders. 
Wary of the arrival of a foreign entity in his domains yet keen on 
generating profit, Sheikh Khaz’al signed a lease in 1909 for the parts of 
Abadan Island on which the Company had decided to build its refinery. 
Despite challenges and obstacles, European engineers erected a refinery that 
was able from 1913 to process high-grade petroleum for export. When 
Winston Churchill, the Company’s key lobbyist, decided to switch from the 
use of coal to oil in the British navy on the eve of World War I, his 
government acquired a controlling interest in the Company. Securing and 
expanding Abadan’s oil output became a top priority, and Abadan’s palm 
groves soon gave way to a sprawling modern city. The Company insisted that 
locals did not have the industrial discipline required for the operation, and 
instead it imported its skilled labor from India, Burma, Iraq, Palestine, Europe, 
  
and even China. Abadan’s population jumped from around 20,000 in 1910 to 
40-60,000 in the early 1920s, and 200,000 in the 1940s.
5
 To accommodate this 
influx of workers, the Company reluctantly engaged in urban development and 
colonial-inspired social engineering.
6
  
<FIG. 12.1 NEAR HERE> 
The British staff was housed in modern bungalows in the district of 
Braim at one end of the island, where the breeze made the extremely hot 
climate somewhat tolerable. Here, they were sheltered by the massive metallic 
barrier of the refinery, which stood in the middle of the island, and could 
nurture an exclusive, elite lifestyle. On the other side lay the “native town,” 
which consisted mainly of Arab villages, the workers’ neighborhood 
Ahmadabad, and the bazaar—and, from the 1920s, also of sprawling 
shantytowns. This segregated urban geography was a material manifestation of 
the ethnically demarcated labor hierarchy with which the Company ran its 
operation in Abadan: white “senior staff” at the top; skilled and semi-skilled 
Indians, Christian (Armenian and Assyrian) and Jewish migrant labor from the 
Middle East in the middle; and masses of Iranian (“Persian” and “Arab”7) 
wage-earners, unskilled, and casual labor at the bottom. 
Plagued by labor unrest from its early days, the oil industry was hit by 
a major strike in 1929, when workers protested against low wages and their 
appalling working and living conditions.
8
 This historic strike inspired 
nationalist forces across Iran, and with the more resolute Reza Shah in power 
in Tehran from 1925 the Company was forced to make concessions. Pressured 
by growing social disorder, overcrowding, crime, and disease in the 
  
shantytowns, the Company began in 1926 to engage in urban planning, 
building a new bazaar while providing sanitation and infrastructure, electricity 
and paved roads. Eventually, the Company would build hospitals, schools, 
cinemas, and a university, and in the 1930s and 1940s, new, modern 
neighborhoods for Iranian labor, such as Bahmanshir and Bawarda. Through 
these developments, the Company sought to present an image of the city as a 
modern, egalitarian space of welfare and progress.
9
 
<FIG. 12.2 NEAR HERE> 
Yet this image stood in contrast to the lived reality of most Iranians in 
Abadan. The Company’s public relations strategy, combined with some 
improvements in quality of life and increased social mobility, was in the end 
not enough to gloss over the unequal distribution of power and resources in 
Abadan, or to deflect criticism of the British exploitation of Iranian resources.  
The Company was nonetheless able to manage discontent in Abadan 
during the boom years of the 1930s. With the ousting of Reza Shah and the 
British invasion of southern Iran in 1941, the Company further strengthened 
its foothold in Khuzestan. During World War II, Iran was plagued by food 
shortages, famine, disease, and insecurity. Citing a potential threat of sabotage 
against oil installations as well as Khuzestan’s strategic position on the supply 
route through Iran to the Soviet Union, the Company pushed through a 
demand for martial law, eventually turning the whole province into a “special 
military zone” under a pro-British military governor-general. The 
militarization of daily life, increased social control, food rationing, drastic 
fluctuations in labor demand, widespread hunger, epidemics, overcrowding 
  
and a spike in crime fuelled anti-British sentiment and socialist-inspired labor 
activism against the Company, and in May 1946, the oil worker movement 
reasserted itself in Abadan. By that time, Western diplomats and Company 
officials were convinced that the activism was orchestrated by Moscow as part 
of a bloodless war between Britain and the Soviet Union.   
The July 1946 oil strike heralded the demand for oil nationalization 
that, in 1951, would bring an end to quasi-colonial British rule in Khuzestan. 
In order to properly grasp the violence that occurred during the 1946 strikes, 
however, it is necessary to take a closer look at the histories of two of the 
involved actors—the Arabs and the labor activists. 
 
Tribes, Workers and Unrest in the Oil City 
By the 1910s, a modus vivendi had been established between the Company 
and Sheikh Khaz’al. The former lent the latter recognition, external protection, 
and loans in return for access to and security on Abadan Island. The Company 
often used Khaz’al’s tribal forces to quell social disorder and labor. Under 
Khaz’al, Arab notables profited from the presence of the Company, and a 
handful of sheikhs enriched themselves as contractors or as bazaar merchants. 
Others were able to benefit from Abadan’s development, working as guards, 
servants, or day laborers, while farmers and fishermen sold their produce to 
the Company. Yet the Company rarely employed Arabs as wage earners, and 
thus prevented their integration into the oil labor force.  
<FIG. 12.3 NEAR HERE> 
  
The Company’s—and indeed Britain’s—policy towards the sheikh was 
ambivalent: on the one hand, they depended on his cooperation to secure their 
oil output, but on the other they had by the 1920s become wary over his 
autonomist aspirations. The sheikh revolted against Tehran in 1916 and 1921, 
even proposing to separate his domains from Iran. Having toyed with the idea, 
Britain ultimately rejected Arab secession, and in 1925 Reza Khan took 
Sheikh Khaz’al prisoner and abolished the sheikhdom. A tribal insurgency 
erupted across Khuzestan, but now the British and the Company supported the 
state’s clampdown against their erstwhile Arab allies. The unrest in Abadan 
and Mohammerah was crushed but rural Arabs continued for decades to resist 
and protest harassment, new taxes, forced conscription, and the expropriation 
of land, animals and foodstuff by state authorities.   
The Iranian central government rapidly consolidated its rule by 
uprooting traditional authority. While tribal communities throughout 
Khuzestan (and indeed, throughout Iran) were violently subdued, disarmed 
and forcibly sedentarized, the Arabs were largely marginalized on the new 
political and social landscape that appeared after 1925. The free movement of 
families across the previously fluid national borders was curtailed, the use of 
the Arabic language in public was outlawed, and cities were given new 
Persian-sounding names—Mohammerah became Khorramshahr, for example. 
While the Iranian state was now present in Abadan through municipal, 
juridical, military and police authorities, the Company, backed up by powerful 
British diplomats, retained much real power. In the event of a crisis, the 
  
Company either lobbied for British military intervention or used its own 
security forces, which operated in a legal grey area. 
<FIG. 12.4  NEAR HERE> 
While pockets of urbanization and modern education appeared across 
the region, most Arabs continued to live in poverty and illiteracy, barred from 
influence, and witnesses to a great influx of outsiders. Displacement of Arabs 
from Abadan had begun with Khaz’al’s land leases in Braim, and continued 
with the Company-led evictions in the bazaar and in Bawarda in the 1920s and 
30s.
10
 While some Iranian white-collar workers were able to move gradually 
into the new middle-class districts in the 1940s, Arabs were mostly confined 
to the squalid, crime-ridden neighborhoods of Kofeysheh, Koshtargah, and 
Ahmadabad, located outside the Company’s housing zones, or lived in simple 
villages on rural Abadan Island. Some resorted to highway robbery, 
smuggling, and piracy, and memoirs testify to the fact that Arab tribes would 
still engage in raids against Abadan’s citizens as late as the 1940s.11 
Against this backdrop of inequality, agitation with ethnic overtones 
spread among the Arabs in Khuzestan in the 1940s. Contrary to popular 
historical narratives still prevalent in Iran, which present this agitation as 
completely stage-managed by the British, recent research has demonstrated the 
development of a genuine Arab movement across the province.
12
 The key 
grievances of this movement included the lack of land rights and the 
expropriation of Arab property, yet there were also demands for cultural 
rights, political recognition, and regional autonomy.  
  
British diplomats regularly reported on Persian-Arab tensions during 
World War II, on Arab distrust of the Iranian authorities, and on the violent 
treatment of Arab civilians by the Iranian gendarmerie and military.
13
 In May 
1944, local authorities reported their worries that Sheikh Jaseb—son of Sheikh 
Khaz’al—was scheming to return from his exile in Basra in order to establish 
an independent Arab state in Khuzestan.
14
 In February 1945, the Iranian army 
attempted unsuccessfully to disarm Arab tribes on Abadan Island.
15
 In January 
1946, another of Khaz’al’s sons, Sheikh Abdollah, launched a futile rebellion. 
Britain did not—as Iranian nationalists at the time feared and have since 
maintained—back the idea of an independent Arabistan, and it is clear from 
diplomatic correspondence that the Arab leaders felt betrayed. The Company 
was not interested either: as a business enterprise, it nurtured no dreams of 
state-making.  
<FIG. 12.5 NEAR HERE> 
Faced with rising social disorder, political discontent, and troop 
withdrawal from Iran in early 1946, British diplomats were particularly 
anxious about the threat posed by the oil labor movement. The dramatic 
history of this movement began when Indian migrant workers staged protests 
and strikes in the refinery in the 1910s and 1920s, to which the Company 
responded with mass deportations and the use of Arab tribal forces to quell 
disturbances. By the late 1920s, Iranian workers began to extract concessions 
from the Company by threatening to paralyze the refinery. In a fascinating 
account, a Soviet-trained labor activist sheds light on the mobilization leading 
to the 1929 strike.
16
 Alarmed by Bolshevik infiltration, the Company 
  
pressured the Iranian authorities for tighter security while at the same time 
expanding its own system of surveillance. During World War II, thousands of 
Iranians were suddenly dismissed from the refinery, and while intercommunal 
clashes broke out, discontent even spread to British personnel.
17
 Underground 
socialist activism escalated among the oil workers, and by 1946 the Soviet-
backed Communist Tudeh Party and its affiliated trade unions were ready to 
take effective control of Abadan. 
At that point, the Arabs were practically the only Iranian community in 
Abadan not to have joined the socialist labor movement. There can be several 
reasons for this. The Company had from the beginning of its operations 
viewed Arabs as unreliable labor, and instead preferred Iranians from outside 
the region or imported labor from abroad. The Arab labor that was employed 
consisted mainly of day laborers or contractor teams headed by sheikhs. It 
may be that some Arabs chose to rely on alternative sources of livelihood 
rather than enduring the grueling work conditions in the oil industry, or—as 
Arab activists maintained—that the Company in its recruitment discriminated 
against the Arabs. Either way, Arabs were underrepresented among the 
Company’s workers, and thus simply did not have the same stake in the labor 
movement as the mostly “Persian” wage-earners18.  
There are also possible socio-cultural explanations. While others often 
severed tribal and traditional ties to their birthplaces when they moved to 
Abadan, Arabs still lived in their customary setting. Tribal power had even 
been revived in the political vacuum following the forced abdication of Reza 
Shah in 1941, and the conservative sheikhs were apprehensive of the Tudeh 
  
challenge to feudalism and tribalism. It is also likely that some Arabs felt 
threatened by socialist rhetoric, which was antithetical to local mores, and 
perhaps alienated by the liberal spirit of new Abadan. Although Tudeh 
stressed ethnic equality in its propaganda, and translated some of its 
communiqués into Arabic, the party had largely failed to attract the Arabs. In 
the summer 1946, intercommunal differences gave way to political violence. 
 
Talking Sedition: Spaces of Contention in Abadan 
Despite the Company’s vigorous attempts to curb dissent, the success of the 
labor movement was nonetheless directly tied to the very spaces created by the 
oil industry. Khuzestan’s refineries, oil wells, and workshops afforded 
activists close proximity to their peers and to sites for communication, debate, 
and the organization of dissent. In the overcrowded urban sprawls, the control 
of movement was nearly impossible. Memoirs testify to the fact that 
resentment towards the Company was fuelled by the combination of slowly 
improving living conditions for Iranian workers and the rapidly rising but 
unfulfilled expectations of modernity that urbanization had generated.
19
 One 
urban space—the club—played a key role in the socialization and 
politicization of Abadan’s citizens. Its history throws light on Company social 
engineering, as well as on the spatial context of the 1946 clashes.  
In the 1910s, the Company opened the so-called Gymkhana Club in the 
exclusive Braim district, which catered to the British Senior Staff. The 
Gymkhana boasted billiard tables, a bar with a dance floor, a restaurant, and a 
hall for meetings and lectures. As the Western expatriate community grew, the 
  
city saw a proliferation of clubs for boating, cricket, football, gardening, and 
so on—all with annual fairs, shows, matches, and balls. There were various 
freemasonry lodges, amateur theater groups, scout organizations, and social 
clubs that would later be graced by jazz legends such as David Brubeck, Dizzy 
Gillespie, and Duke Ellington. The dancing saloons, swimming pools, tennis 
courts, cafeterias and bars presented a welcome alternative to the seedy 
speakeasies, opium dens, and brothels of the “native town.” The Company 
believed that clubs and social activities would not only cultivate Western 
urbanity, but also reduce alienation, restlessness, and disgruntlement among its 
senior employees.
20
 The clubs remained exclusive to Europeans, while a 
couple of less well-equipped facilities were provided separately for Indians. 
Although a handful of Iranians managed to enroll in the latter, and while 
Iranian Armenians were able to open a club of their own, ordinary Iranian 
labor was generally barred from these social amenities. 
<FIG. 12.6 NEAR HERE> 
The first organized demand for a club for Iranians was tied directly to 
the emergence of a nascent socialist movement. When Soviet-trained activists 
arrived in Abadan in 1927, their strategy to mobilize laborers was two-fold: on 
the one hand, they organized a clandestine network to function as a secret 
trade union; and on the other hand, they would establish the first athletic club 
for Iranians in Abadan. Prepared for Company opposition to such a club, the 
activists enlisted a number of non-Communist Iranian white-collar workers to 
persuade a government official to issue a permit, and then swiftly announced 
the opening of Kaveh Sports Club to the public. Masses attended the 
  
inauguration where they listened to representatives from various guilds giving 
“stirring speeches unheard of before in Khuzestan”21–a dress rehearsal for the 
1929 strike. Although Kaveh Club was frequented by many who were 
unaffiliated with the secret trade union, the Company could not tolerate its 
existence. With the help of Abadan Police, the Company had Kaveh Club shut 
down after two months of workers’ resistance. Indeed, mere membership in 
the club was later used as a justification for arrest during the clampdown 
following the 1929 strike.
22
 Yet the Company eventually had to allow new 
professional and recreational spaces. From 1931 onwards, the Company built 
clubs for clerks, seamen, artisans, and eventually the mid-ranking Iranian 
workers. To entertain the lower classes, the Company also established popular 
swimming pools and open-air cinemas. As sites of sociability and 
socialization, even athletic clubs were rightly feared to also function as sites of 
political activity, and Company managers allocated resources to have 
Abadan’s burgeoning club milieu monitored.  
By the mid-1940s the budding labor movement had turned many 
Company clubs into centers of resistance, even creating a parallel set of clubs 
for the various trade unions of taxi drivers, welders, and so forth, all 
considered illegal by the Company. Whereas the Communist activists of the 
1920s had to congregate secretly in private homes or in the palm groves 
outside of Abadan, the Tudeh activists of the 1940s would use clubs as venues 
for Party meetings, dissident activity, and speeches against British 
imperialism. The Company was aware that, in order to suppress discontent, the 
clubs had to be curbed, even if their sheer number made it nearly impossible. 
  
In October 1945, the British consulate general in Ahwaz wrote to the 
ambassador in Tehran that the military governorship and martial law instituted 
in Khuzestan during the war should remain in effect because: 
 
(1) it is easier in that way to prohibit meetings and generally to 
interfere with the activities of parties and clubs liable to talk sedition—
though as you say even a Military Governor can’t really suppress that 
sort of thing forever, and (2) malefactors are speedily punished 
(sometimes, I hear, even before they have done their foul deed) and 
that creates an excellent impression on other intending malefactors.
23
 
 
As hotbeds of “sedition talk”—the subversive practice of ungrateful 
subalterns (“malefactors”) who had to be punished for their insubordination 
(“foul deeds”)—the clubs had thus developed from Company-controlled 
spaces to nodal points in an urban network of anti-British activism. Within 
days after the British troop withdrawal from Abadan in March 1946, sedition 
talk gave way to a series of wildcat strikes, and then a huge show of the labor 
movement’s strength for the 1946 May Day demonstrations. The Iranian 
police first instructed Tudeh to celebrate the day inside the clubs but, realizing 
the sheer numbers of participants, local authorities allowed for “overflow 
orderly meetings outside in the vicinity” of the clubs.24 In the end, tens of 
thousands of workers marched throughout Abadan, disregarding all 
instructions. In a very literal sense, labor activism had spilled over into the 
  
streets, transgressing the coercive logics of social control in the oil city. 
Abrahamian describes the power grab: 
 
By mid-June [1946], the Tudeh organization in Khuzestan paralleled, 
rivaled, and, in many towns, overshadowed the provincial 
administration … Its branches determined food prices, enjoyed the 
support of the local fire brigades, and controlled communications, 
especially truck communications, between the main urban centers. Its 
unions represented workers’ grievances before management, collected 
funds for future emergencies, organized an elaborate shop-steward 
system, and opened forty-five club houses in Abadan alone. Moreover, 
its militias patrolled the streets, guarded the oil installations, and 
impressed foreign observers by quickly transporting 2,500 volunteers 
from Abadan to Khorramshahr to build an emergency flood wall.
25
 
 
The Company general manager in Abadan warned that, with over 
25,000 members, local power was now effectively in the hands of “armed 
clubs” who were patrolling the streets wearing Tudeh armbands.26 In the 
administrative language, club– and in the local vernacular, kolub –now 
signified a political actor rather than a material space. Despite a ban on public 
gatherings, Tudeh organized huge open-air meetings and took over Company 
buses, ending racially segregated public transport. In one incident, Indians, 
seen as lackeys of the British, were forced out of a football club by angry 
Iranians; and in another, labor activists climbed the walls of a club during a 
  
theater performance, inviting an outside crowd of between 4,000 and 5,000 to 
“take possession” of the premises, and demanding an end to discrimination 
between Iranian and Western staff.
27
 Tudeh vigilantes also forced Arab 
merchants, accused of hoarding, to sell goods to trade union members at 
reduced prices. The labor movement, in short, had broken the lines of urban 
demarcation, appropriating formerly exclusive spaces and threatening the 
Western enclave and its Indian and Arab servants. “Violence,” a group of 
British MPs warned, “can occur at any moment.”28 The consul in 
Khorramshahr asked the Foreign Office in London to draw up a clandestine 
plan for a possible military intervention.
29
 Such a move, however, would have 
been highly problematic, as Britain and the Soviet Union had just withdrawn 
from Iranian soil amid great controversy over Moscow-backed rebellions in 
Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Indeed, the Tehran press was already 
claiming that the British army was in fact secretly using Company facilities as 
military bases.  
The Company and the British diplomats were particularly alarmed by 
reports of increased Soviet activity and overtures to Arab tribal leaders. In 
what appeared a blatant publicity campaign inside the British sphere of 
interest, the Soviet consul at Ahwaz was seen openly socializing and playing 
dice with commoners in the coffeehouses of Khorramshahr.
30
 After a tour of 
Khuzestan in June 1946, the British ambassador concluded that the Company 
would soon be forced to defend itself against Tudeh.
31
 Looking for alternatives 
to an actual reinvasion of southern Iran, diplomats were contemplating a resort 
  
to an old Company strategy: using armed Arab tribes against labor activists. 
But there were more complex underlying dynamics in the July 1946 clashes.  
<FIG. 12.7 NEAR HERE> 
 
Arab Mobilization and the Politics of Fear 
Throughout 1946, Arab sheikhs repeatedly complained to the Company about 
Tudeh’s aggressive campaigning. In Abadan’s rural hinterland, Arabs 
violently confronted itinerant Tudeh propagandists, and during the 1946 May 
Day parades, the protesting crowds allegedly shouted slogans against the 
sheikhs, whom Tudeh considered henchmen of British imperialism. Following 
the parades, a sheikh reported that, due to threats and propaganda, some of the 
Arab contractors were likely to join Tudeh. This represented a frightening 
scenario for the Company: whereas the Arab contractors had until then been 
considered immune to socialist infiltration, there was now reason to fear that 
some might join the anti-British wave. The sheikh warned that the tensions 
might end in violence.
32
 
Reading the diplomatic correspondence, it is impossible to ascertain a 
clear British strategy. On the one hand, the official line was one of caution 
and, as previously, official Arab requests for support were snubbed. The 
consul in Khorramshahr, for example, told a sheikh, who wanted to bring back 
the exiled Sheikh Abdollah from Kuwait to Khuzestan, that “the Arabs should 
do nothing which could be calculated to embarrass H. M. Govt. or their own 
Govt.,” and that they should not “bring trouble on themselves.”33 On the other 
hand, some Company officers certainly did assist in mobilizing the Arabs.
34
 In 
  
May 1946, Abadan’s new governor promised these officers that action would 
be taken against Tudeh, including the deployment of Arab forces.
35
 In July, a 
military attaché to the Company, Colonel H. J. Underwood, noted that violent 
attacks on Tudeh members by Lor tribesmen east of Abadan had had a 
“wholesome effect,” which could be emulated in Abadan by a “discreet 
cultivation of good neighbourhood policy amongst the Arabs.”36 Underwood 
had already met with sheikhs in June, reporting that Arabs were “definitely 
against the Tudeh” and “ready to help the Company by force.” In the same 
report, he also suggested that it was “perhaps all to the good that the Arabs 
should form themselves into a patriotic Union.”37  
On the night of 12 June, Arab sheikhs gathered in Khorramshahr and 
Ahwaz to establish such an organization—the so-called Union of Tribes of 
Khuzestan (Ettehadiye-ye ‘Ashayer-e Khuzestan), or Arab Tribal Union 
(ATU). Yet this action may also be understood as more than simply a 
Company ploy. On several occasions in the 1920s, and again in the 1940s, 
Arabs in Khuzestan had attempted to organize politically. While some 
initiatives were local in orientation and tribal in structure, others had more 
elaborate pan-Arabist agendas, yet only few openly championed Arab 
independence. The ATU established in June 1946 instead appeared primarily 
motivated by anger with the fact that Tudeh was pressuring the Company to 
hire Persian rather than Arab contractors.
38
 Fearful of Tudeh “threats,” the 
Arabs even sent a telegraph to the prime minister in Tehran protesting over 
“the Tudeh closing of the Bazaar” in Khorramshahr.39 In turn, Tudeh members 
warned Tehran that if they did not receive protection, they would have to 
  
“arrange their own.” Indeed, the British feared that the Soviets were feeding 
Tudeh weapons through Basra, while the Tudeh claimed that the British were 
arming the Arabs.
40
  
On 23 June, Arab sheikhs gathered for a traditional dance ceremony 
(yazleh) in Ahwaz, and the following day Arabs from across rural Khuzestan 
descended upon Khorramshahr to inaugurate the first modern Arab “club” 
under the auspices of the ATU.
41
 A crowd of about 10,000 to 12,000 people 
attended the ceremony, allegedly including Sheikh Jaseb, son of Sheikh 
Khaz’al.42 The organizers triumphantly read out a charter containing ethnic 
demands including parliamentary representation and the right to teach Arabic 
in public schools, as well as an end to Tudeh interference in provincial affairs 
and assistance from the Iranian state in developing the local infrastructure and 
economy.
43
 Importantly, the charter also criticized the Company for neglecting 
Arabs by building its facilities on Arab land but hiring outside labor, which 
had resulted in “much poverty and distress.” In particular, it bemoaned the loss 
of historic Arab date palm areas, and demanded that the Company “examine 
the legal rights of the Arab labourers and engage Arabs in a much larger 
proportion to other Persians.”44  
Such wording may put into question Tudeh’s accusation that the ATU 
was a mere Company pawn. The fact that the Union had its own agenda was 
underscored by its resistance to a demand from Tehran, reiterated by British 
diplomats, to change its name to the non-ethnic “Khuzestan Farmers’ Union.” 
Conversely, the anti-Tudeh emphasis indicates that the sheikhs shared mutual 
interests with the conservative faction of the divided ruling elite in Tehran. 
  
This impression is bolstered by correspondence between the ATU and Prime 
Minister Ahmad Qavvam, and by the fact that the ATU also intermittently 
identified as a “Democratic Union” in order to indicate support for Qavvam’s 
Democratic Party. In short, while Tehran certainly feared Arab separatism, 
there were probably also forces eager to exploit the Union as a tactical 
counterbalance to the Tudeh. It is important to note that the charter clearly 
stressed the ATU’s adherence to the constitution and territorial integrity of 
Iran. 
After Khorramshahr, the ATU quickly moved to set up clubs in towns 
such as Bandar Mahshahr (Ma’shur), Hendijan, and Shadegan (Fallahiyah),45 
and then announced it would open a club in Abadan on 5 July. Fearing inter-
ethnic conflict, local authorities refused to issue a permit. Tudeh, in turn, 
distributed pamphlets in Arabic warning people not to let the British and their 
allied sheikhs “plant seeds of enmity between Arabs and Persians,”46 and 
announced that the ATU was funded and instigated by the British. The trade 
unions then called for a general strike across the province on 14 July. Among 
their demands, they included the dismissal of Khuzestan’s pro-British 
governor general; an end to Company political interference and intrigues with 
the ATU; and improvements in health services, housing and transport, as well 
as the institution of weekend (Friday) pay.
47
 According to an article in the 
Tudeh-affiliated Rahbar daily, 2,000 workers took control of transport in and 
out of Abadan on 14 July “so as to prevent the British from inciting the local 
tribesmen”—a euphemism for Arabs. Other workers, Rahbar reported, 
maintained “perfect order” throughout the city.48 The trade unions’ gradual 
  
takeover of the city was recorded meticulously by Company intelligence: from 
truck garages to hospitals, port installations, and swimming pools, Tudeh 
moved to capture all facilities. Yet even then, the British consul rejected the 
governor general’s proposal to arm Arab tribes.49 As armed Arabs were 
gathering in Abadan, it was too late, however, to prevent a violent encounter.  
 
Monsters of Mayhem 
Unsurprisingly, Tudeh and Company accounts of what happened on 14 and 15 
July differ. Certainly, there was a clash sometime after 6 p.m., but the 
otherwise detailed Company accounts are murky on the exact sequence of 
events. According to one report, “excited irresponsible leaders” had mobilized 
“an inflamed roaring mob” of several thousand Tudeh supporters to “attack 
the Arabs” in order to pre-empt an Arab attack on a Tudeh club.50 After this 
initial attack, a larger crowd poured into downtown Abadan, where the Arab 
club was burned down. During the clashes, several prominent sheikhs and 
Arab (as well as non-Arab) merchants were lynched or killed in fights with 
crowds, labor activists, and possibly police, including Hajj Haddad, Mahdi 
Hossein Gazi, Sheikh Naser, and Yusef Kowaiti. These killings, Company 
officers feared, would “definitely mean an immediate and serious Arab versus 
Tudeh war.”51 The houses and warehouses of sheikhs were looted, while files 
in the Arab club were confiscated. Police opened fire on looters, and by 2 a.m. 
on 15 July, the Company had received reports of “about 150 casualties in the 
hospital, and the mortuary already full,” with between fifteen and twenty 
deaths. Injuries, the hospital reported, included “mostly clubbing, some knife 
  
and gunshot wounds; several broken limbs.” Most wounded and dead, 
according to this report (and to Tudeh accounts
52
) were Persians; according to 
other reports, most casualties were Arabs.
53
 Tudeh spoke of more than fifty 
dead, but claimed that actual numbers could never be ascertained, since 
corpses were dumped in mass graves outside Abadan.
54
 Around seventy 
arrests were made, and there was similar unrest in other cities of Khuzestan. 
The following day, the atmosphere was tense and full of rumors of impending 
Arab retribution. Abadan’s governor had initially suggested “that Arabs might 
be ‘allowed’ to burn down Tudeh H.Q.” to settle the score,55 but the Company 
apparently pressured the police to prevent this.  
In a lengthy report, Counselor of the British Embassy in Tehran, Sir 
Clairmont Skrine claimed that Tudeh pamphlets called on locals “to make 
mincemeat” of agents of “the colonising foreign powers” and that when 
violence broke out, the crowd acted on this invitation by targeting the Arabs.
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Indeed, British intelligence claimed that they had recorded speeches by Tudeh 
leaders on 14 July calling on workers to kill named Arabs collaborating with 
the Company.
57
 According to Skrine, Tudeh had planned that Arabs be 
“murdered brutally pour encourager les autres; the Arabs were to be cowed, 
and the power of their Union was to be finally broken by terroristic methods.” 
He provided a vivid depiction of the violence: 
 
At the monster meeting at 6.30 p.m. inflammatory speeches must have 
been made, for at about 7.30 the roar of a mob out for blood terrified 
all within earshot. Within an hour the Arab Union Headquarters had 
  
been attacked, cars and houses set on fire, and at least three prominent 
Arab Union supporters brutally murdered in their houses. Bodies were 
mutilated and thrown into the river, women hacked with knives, houses 
set on fire. As might have been expected, the Arab population hit back 
in force and being in greater numbers than the Persians they cudgelled 
and chopped at a considerable number of Tudeh supporters, perhaps 
150. Only the resolute action of Major Fatih [the Abadan head of 
police] and his men who used rifle fire to quell the mob saved Abadan 
from much greater catastrophe. Left to themselves, the Arabs might 
easily have beaten or hacked to death every Persian in the place.
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The killing of Hossein Gazi was described by another Company officer: “The 
crowd found this unfortunate man at home and brutally beat him to death with 
clubs. In the end his head was torn off and carried away. The crowd blooded 
themselves and their clubs with the blood of their victims.”59 
The language is dramatic and the depiction of the crowd racist: the 
mindless, monster-like mobs of bloodthirsty Orientals out to terrorize, 
mutilate, and behead each other—and in the process, to raze the modern urban 
order. The description of violence is marked by feral viciousness: bodies—
even the bodies of women—were “hacked,” “cudgeled,” and “chopped” with 
primitive weapons, while the attackers ritualistically smeared themselves with 
blood. The only force that quelled the mob and saved Abadan was the rational 
thinking, modern rifles, and “resolute action” of Major Fateh—the only 
official Company ally in this situation. Thus, the British diplomats and 
  
Company officers maintained that Tudeh had started the violence, but that 
both sides constituted irrational crowds. Unsurprisingly, in their testimonies 
before a military tribunal convened by the Iranian authorities after the unrest, 
Tudeh activists presented a quite different account. Their testimonies were 
recorded by Farajollah Mizani (a.k.a. Javanshir), a prominent Tudeh activist 
who published them in exile in 1980 in the form of a booklet.
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During the trial, Tudeh leader Hossein Jowdat outlined a conspiracy: 
aided by British forces and Iraqi Arab nationalists, the Company had incited 
the Arabs to crush the labor movement. According to him, the first step was to 
bring Sheikh Abdollah, along with weapons and ammunition, from across the 
Shatt al-’Arab (Arvand Rud, in Persian) into Abadan’s vicinity. By arming the 
Arabs, the Company would create chaos during the general strike, thus 
spoiling an otherwise orderly and legitimate industrial action. The end goal, 
Jowdat maintained, was to destroy Tudeh and stir the Arabs towards a 
separatist rebellion that could secure Britain’s oil interests. To prove the 
British hand in this conspiracy, Jowdat claimed that those scheduling the 
opening of the Arab club had made calculation errors between the Islamic and 
Iranian calendar, and that an ATU proclamation calling for violence against 
Tudeh bore signs of a clumsy translation from English to Persian.
61
  
Furthermore, Jowdat claimed that the Company had distributed 
employment notices in the region on the first day of the strike in order to 
attract hordes of unemployed riff-raff to Abadan. When these people 
converged in the city and were informed that the jobs had already been taken, 
they would drift around aimlessly in the streets, creating an atmosphere of 
  
disorder, and eventually loot the residences of prominent sheikhs and 
merchants. Jowdat explained that clashes started when Arabs attacked a car 
carrying two Tudeh members who were about to inspect their own club. A 
melee resulted in the shooting of a Tudeh member, which in turn attracted 
others to the scene, including the aforementioned loitering riff-raff. Violence 
escalated from here, just as the Company had planned.
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 The next day, the 
military ejected the drifters from Abadan, rendering a proper investigation 
impossible. With this account, Jowdat exonerated Tudeh from the violence, 
placing the blame squarely on the Arabs, “the British” and the unemployed 
mobs.  
Although this explanation differs from the official British line, some of 
the wording is quite similar. For example, Jowdat explained that the Company 
had unleashed a “monster of turmoil and disorder and mayhem” (hayula-ye 
eghteshash va na-amni va harj-o-marj). The violence of the real culprits—
certain Arabs (referred to euphemistically as “contractors”) and the “loiterers” 
or “riff-raff”—was either mindless or rooted in suspicious motives. The Arab 
tribes and the riff-raff had “terrorized” ordinary people and ruined the state of 
peace and order instituted by Tudeh. Underlying this language, I would argue, 
is a tangible urban/rural discrimination, which intersects with perceived ethnic 
and ideological differences between the Arabs and Persians. While Tudeh 
leaders are careful not to indict the Arabs wholesale, and instead distinguish 
between loyal Arab compatriots and suspicious Arab “outsiders,” they 
nonetheless paint a picture of regressive tribes and treacherous separatists 
hiding across the river in Iraq. The Arab enemy, in this account, has descended 
  
from the backwaters, armed by the British and then placed in the heart of 
Abadan’s modern urban space, thus reawakening a backward monster and 
unleashing it upon the progressive order championed by socialism. 
Apart from Company records and Tudeh testimonies, there is an 
eyewitness account by the esteemed writer and translator Najaf Daryabandari, 
which contains interesting details.
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 According to Daryabandari, Sheikh 
Haddad, who was beheaded during the violence, was a famous character in 
Abadan’s urban life: he was a well-paid contractor, and would tour the city 
every day in a fancy open jeep; his office functioned as headquarters of Arabs 
working for the Company, which is why it was stormed by Tudeh. 
Daryabandari acknowledged that, during the clashes, “a sort of Persian-Arab 
fight took shape,” but argued that the real reason for the clashes was to be 
found in Company-Tudeh relations. He added that no ethnic violence had 
occurred after 1946. The day after the clashes, Daryabandari witnessed how 
“the ground and walls of [Haddad’s office building] were smeared in blood,” 
while “martial law was declared, the trade unions were besieged and labor 
activism in Abadan curtailed.” However, Daryabandari recalls, activism 
“stayed in our hearts and minds and attracted us to the Tudeh Party and to 
resistance against the Company.”64 
Whether they had instigated the Arabs or not, the British reacted to the 
violence with trepidation. First, a sloop was anchored in the Shatt al-’Arab, 
threateningly facing Abadan. A British-Indian brigade was then deployed to 
Basra, ready to move into Khuzestan.
65
 British diplomats feared that the strike 
had only been the first step of a larger Soviet-backed scheme to disrupt oil 
  
production and ultimately oust the British from Iran. The Foreign Office, 
however, remained opposed to the idea of arming the Arabs in the event of 
further labor disturbances. Yet maybe such action was already redundant: 
indeed, the consul in Khorramshahr triumphantly declared in August that the 
combined effect of a British military presence in Basra and Iraqi agitation over 
the repression of Iran’s Arabs had had “the very desirable effect of stimulating 
the [Iranian] Central Govt. into taking more vigorous measures against the 
Tudeh.”66  
Although the Company eventually agreed to Friday pay, thus ending 
the strike, the violence was utilized by Company-loyal local authorities as an 
excuse for draconian measures against the labor movement. There were mass 
arrests of Tudeh members, and all gatherings of more than three people were 
outlawed. Jowdat describes this situation as resembling a military occupation. 
The Company’s “Iranian-lookalike” forces placed sentinels with machine guns 
on the roofs of private homes, holding the laborers hostage in their own city: 
“Soldiers and armed policemen had occupied the streets, public centers and 
thoroughfares of the city, and everywhere you could see the flash of 
bayonets.”67 Tudeh was forced to retreat and reorganize underground, as the 
laborers had lost control over Abadan. Yet the Company’s foothold was 
unsustainable. Across Iran, newspapers gave extensive coverage to the 
violence as yet another example of British meddling in Iranian affairs and of 
the peril of Arab separatism. The experiences of July 1946 radicalized the 
leftist and anti-imperialist current, and in the aftermath of the strike, Prime 
Minister Qavvam conceded a number of cabinet posts to pro-Tudeh 
  
politicians. Five years later, with the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, 
British hegemony in Khuzestan came to an end. The very last remaining 
Company employees in Abadan, “toting tennis rackets and golf clubs” along 
with all their belongings, gathered in the Gymkhana Club–the first club in 
Abadan and a symbol of segregation–from where they were evacuated out of 
Iran on a British gunboat to the sound of a military band playing ‘Colonel 
Bogey’.68 
Meanwhile, the disheartened Arab sheikhs feared that their peers 
would end up joining Tudeh out of fear for retribution. British diplomats 
reported that the military tribunals set up by the Iranian authorities were 
severely biased towards Tudeh, and that the Arabs themselves had not 
cooperated in a proper manner by documenting their side of the events.
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Leading sheikhs went into hiding, while others headed to Baghdad and Cairo, 
where they presented the Khuzestani Arab case before the Arab League.
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 The 
Iraqi and Egyptian press expressed solidarity with their Arab brethren and 
outrage at the Iranian government and Tudeh. In the end, however, the Arabs 
did not receive international support sufficient for re-launching an autonomist 
movement—nor did they win any justice from the Iranian state. The Arab 
clubs were shut down, and to this day it remains virtually impossible for 
Arabs—still considered with suspicion by the authorities—to organize 
politically inside Khuzestan.  
 
<LINE-BREAK> 
 
  
The city of Abadan was simultaneously the stage for and the object of the July 
1946 clashes. The fight over a particular socio-spatial unit—the club—in the 
urban landscape of a city such as Abadan was an expression of multi-layered 
conflicts over resources and power in a modern nation-state. The club 
developed from being the symbol of a British/European/white enclave in a 
segregated city to become, first, a symbol of resistance against imperialism in 
a multicultural city marked by leftist mobilization, and finally, for some 
Arabs, a symbol of a minority’s fight for representation in a nation-state 
dominated by a Persian-speaking majority. Thus, there were multiple interests 
at work in the violence that interacted in more complex ways than the 
simplified binaries of Arab/Persian, contractor/wage earner or tribal/leftist 
suggest.  
Ethnicity certainly played a role: there is ample evidence that the 
mobilization, contention, and violence were perceived by all sides at least 
partially to reflect ethnically framed emotions, demands and interests. But it is 
important not to reduce the clashes to a straightforwardly ethnic conflict: the 
presence of some Arabs among the labor activists, and the fact that not all 
Tudeh targets were Arabs, underscores that the lines were blurred. Although 
the Arab community remained partially marginalized from the rest of the city, 
Abadan was also a place of intermingling, cosmopolitanism, and peaceful 
coexistence. As Daryabandari mentions, there have been practically no overt 
inter-ethnic tensions in Abadan after 1946, with the partial exception of the 
heated days of the Islamic Revolution of 1978–79. In other words, it would be 
  
wrong to perceive the 1946 violence as an expression of inherent primordial 
animosity between “Arabs” and “Persians”.  
Similarly, the conflict should not be boiled down to a mere British 
conspiracy against Iran. Although some Company officers—perhaps on their 
own initiative, and perhaps in conflict with official British policy—were 
directly involved, there is also ample evidence that the British government was 
reluctant to back the sheikhs. Furthermore, the Arab mobilization was not only 
aimed at the labor movement and Tudeh, but also expressed grievances against 
the Company. Sober historical research into the relationship of the anti-Tudeh 
faction in Tehran with the Arab sheikhs in Khuzestan could furthermore shed 
light on the under-examined topic of center-periphery politics in Iran. But this 
does not mean that the British government and the Company, with its coercive 
policies in Khuzestan, can be exonerated. The oil industry was established 
according to a colonialist, segregationist logic that was expressed in both its 
urban development and its labor policy, which favored some groups and 
marginalized others, thus exacerbating ethnic divides in Khuzestan.  
This inequality spawned a struggle for physical spaces of political 
representation such as the club—a key urban space for articulating claims, 
expressing identity, and demanding representation and inclusion. The club 
must therefore be located within the context of the various scales of activity at 
the time: the new global economic imperialism of a Western-owned oil 
company, Iranian nationalism, leftist labor activism, and the ethnically framed 
mobilization of a marginalized minority. The stake invested in the club during 
  
the urban violence of 1946, then, had as much to do with control over public 
space in Abadan as with a contestation of national space in Iran. 
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